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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs claim defendants have breached a contract whereby 
commissions are due for the sale of real property. Defendants 
counterclaimed for a portion of the commissions that had been paid 
alleging that plaintiffs were not licensed as required by Utah 
Statutes. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried to the Court. Plaintiffs were given 
judgment on their Amended Complaint and defendants' Counterclaim 
was dismissed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek to have this Court exercise its supervisory 
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equitiable jurisdiction; review the record; reverse the trial 
court and enter judgment in favor of defendants on their 
counterclaim, or, in the alternative, to reverse and remand to the 
trial court for further appropriate proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Global Recreation, Inc., a Utah corporation, GRI 
subsequently known as Global Recreation, Inc., a Utah Corporation 
dba Global Enterprises and Associates, and generally referred to 
at the trial as "Global" was a marketing firm who entered into an 
exclusive marketing agreement with Associated Industrial 
Developers, commonly referred to as "AID". The date of the 
marketing agreement was September 28, 1976 (Exhibit 1). Subsequent 
to the time the agreement was entered into, AID, owner and 
developer of property in Utah County, associated itself with a 
partner, Near East Technological Services, Inc., a California 
corporation, and commenced doing business under the name of Cedar 
Hills Development Company, a partnership. The defendant in this 
matter is commonly referred to as Cedar Hills, however, this 
results in some confusion because the property that the developer/ 
owner had agreed to market through the plaintiffs consisted of 
several hundred acres in the north part of Utah County, which is 
known as the Town of Cedar Hills. Eldon P. Hendricks is named as 
a plaintiff and was a properly licensed real estate broker who 
associated himself with Global Enterprises on April 13, 1977 (See 
answer to defendants' interrogatories, question No. 6). Mr. 
Hendricks was not in attendance at the trial and did not testify 
in the matter. Plaintiff Stan Snarr was added as a party to the 
action after the original Complaint had been filed. Mr. Snarr was 
-2-
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r 
never licensed as a real estate broker but only as a real estate 
salesman. His employment with Global commenced May 14, 1976 
(Answer to defendants' interrogatories Nos. 2 and 6, R. 60, 61). 
Purusant to the marketing agreement and in answer to defendants' 
interrogatories, plaintiffs admitted that they had been paid total 
commissions in the amount of $79,127.20. Of this total amount, 
the sum of $33,945 was paid from the period of November 24, 1976 
through April 8, 1977. This amount becomes significant because it 
was during that period of time which the defendants alleged that 
the plaintiffs did not have a licensed real estate broker 
associated with them. Prior to the time of trial, the parties, 
through stipulation and settlement, agreed on the amount of the 
commissions after the date of April 15, 1977 for which plaintiffs 
were suing. The issues then at trial, were whether or not 
plaintiffs were entitled to commissions on the Wincor transaction 
and whether defendants were entitled to relief sought in their 
Counterclaim. 
The Wincor transaction involved an earnest money agreement 
entered into on November 19, 1976 (Exhibit 4) which ultimately 
closed on a uniform real estate contract at a later date and upon 
which plaintiffs were paid a partial commission. However, because 
of lack of improvements which had been a part of the transaction, 
the uniform real estate contract was terminated and the property 
was never conveyed by Cedar Hills Development, and no interest 
in the property is claimed by Wincor (T. 71). 
In plaintiffs' memorandum of law, dated November 15, 1978 and 
filed November 17, 1978, it is admitted that plaintiff GRI had 
-3-
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failed to associate itself with a broker prior to April 15, 1977 
(R.29). However, at the time of trial, there was some confusion 
in the evidence as to whether or not the plaintiffs were the 
employees of AID which had a properly licensed broker by the name 
of Jerald Richardson (Exhibit 2). This confusion is compounded by 
reason of the fact that Mr. Richardson was also the party 
representing AID who signed as the owner of the property in the 
listing agreement (Exhibit 1). When sales were made by the 
plaintiffs and commission checks were paid, they were drawn on the 
Cedar Hills Development Company account and were made directly to 
Global Recreation or Global Enterprises for the full amount of the 
commission (See defendants' Exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10). Mr. 
Richardson testified that at the time he signed the marketing 
agreement and the earnest money contracts and the commission 
checks, that he did so as a property owner and not as a real 
estate broker (T. 55, 57, 60, and Exhibit 2). Plaintiff Stan 
Snarr testified that he never received any payments directly from 
AID but was paid a salary from Global (T. 28). 
ARGUMENT I 
TO RECOVER REAL ESTATE COMMISSIONS, THE PLAINTIFF MUST ALLEGE 
AND PROVE COMPLIANCE WITH THE LICENSING STATUTES OF UTAH. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 61-2-1, provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, co-partnership, or 
corporation to engage in the business, act in the capacity 
of, advertise or assume to act as a real estate broker or a 
real estate salesman within this state without first 
obtaining a license under the provisions of this chapter." 
Sectior. 2 of that same chapter then proceeds to define real 
-4-
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estate broker: 
"The term real estate broker within the meaning of this 
chapter shall include all persons, ••• corporations, who 
for another and for a fee, commission or other valuable 
consideration ••• sells ••• or lists ..• any real estate. 11 
Plaintiffs, in making reference to the marketing agreement 
designated as Exhibit 1, state: 
"At the time said contract was signed, the plaintiff Global 
Recreation, Inc., had as employees, several licensed real 
estate agents, but had failed to associate itself with a 
licensed broker." (See memorandum of law dated November 15, 
1978 and filed November 17, 1978). 
By its own terms, the marketing agreement between the parties 
placed the responsibility for all necessary licensing upon Global 
(Exhibit 1, page 2, "best efforts" clause); it was further agreed 
in the "laws of Utah" clause, that the laws of the State of Utah 
would govern the transaction (Exhibit 1, page 3). Therefore, 
defendants claim, based on the contract for commissions due for 
services rendered under the agreement, should be resolved through 
reference to Utah Code Annotated, Section 61-2-1 through 22. 
These sections of the Code were ignored by the trial court in its 
decision. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-18(a) denies standing to 
anyone other than a real estate broker, duly licensed at the time 
of the services resulting in the real estate sale to bring or 
maintain an action in any court of the State. 
The only issue on the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at the 
time of the trial was the Wincor transaction for which plaintiffs 
claimed a balance of $10,700 was still due (the sum of $10,200 as 
part of that Wincor commission had been paid to the plaintiffs on 
-5-
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November 24, 1976). Defendants argue that at the time of the 
Wincor transaction neither Mr. Snarr nor Global Recreation was a 
licensed real estate broker and that plaintiff Eldon Hendricks had 
not at that time become associated with Global and therefore, the 
plaintiffs were precluded by statute from bringing this action. 
Further, defendants contend that plaintiff Stan Snarr nev.er has 
been a licensed real estate broker and has never claimed to be 
licensed as a real estate broker and therefore, has no standing as 
a plaintiff in this action. Defendants argue that the plaintiffs 
first violated the licensing requirements of the Utah Code at the 
time they entered into the marketing agreement to market the real 
property owned by Cedar Hills and further violations occurred with 
concerted actions by Global salesmen leading to unlawfully 
consurnated transactions including the Wincor sale. 
Plaintiffs argued at the time of trial that since the owner/ 
representative of Cedar Hills, Mr. Jerald Richardson, was also a 
licensed broker when he contracted with Global for their services, 
they were in compliance with the licensing requirements and 
entitled to bring suit for recovery of commissions. However, by 
his own trial testimony, (though admittedly confusing), Mr. 
Richardson's answer contradicts this reasoning. While being 
examined and cross examined by both counsel, Mr. Richardson stated: 
(1) the marketing agreement was signed in his capacity as principal 
in the company of Associated Industrial Developers totally 
independent of his incidental qualification as a licensed broker 
(R. 55); (2) Mr. Richardson paid nothing to Global as a broker but 
only as an owner/representative (T. 58 and 59); (3) the customary 
-6-
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broker-salesmen commission split arrangement did not exist between 
Richardson and Global, but such splitting was done between Global 
and its salesmen (T.59); (4) Mr. Richardson authorized all checks 
as a property owner or as a principal for AID (T. 60, 61, and 64); 
(5) the Wincor earnest money agreement (Exhibit 4) was authorized 
and signed by Richardson as owner/representative and not as a 
licensed broker for Global (T. 66). 
Utah Code Annotated, 61-2-10, restricts the procedure for 
payment of commission to salesmen, making it unlawful for salesmen 
to accept consideration for sales efforts from anyone other than 
"his employer, who must be a licensed real estate broker". Mr. 
Richardson admits he made no payments to Global salesmen, though 
they later allege him to be their licensed broker, nor did he sign 
payments check as a broker, but rather as as owner/representative 
of AID. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the salesmen were 
compensated by salary or commissions from their employer, Global 
Recreation, Inc. Not only does the testimony show that Mr. 
Richardson did not act as a broker for Global, but also of every 
greater significance, he was not named as one of the plaintiffs in 
the action brought by Global. If, in fact, Mr. Richardson was 
the broker for Global, he would need to have been one of the 
plaintiffs bringing the action as required by Utah Code Annotated, 
61-2-18. 
In Morris vs. John Price Associates, Inc., 590 P.2d 315, 
(Utah 1979), this Court held that plaintiff Mr. Morris was an 
improper party to an action to collect a real estate commission. 
Mr. Morris was a licensed real estate salesman but not a licensed 
-7-
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broker as defined and required under Utah Code. 
In Diversified General Corp., vs. White Barn Golf Course, 
~' 584 P.2d 849, (Utah 1978), a case dealing with the inter-
pretation of Utah Code Annotated, 61-2-1 and 18, a corporate 
plaintiff was denied recovery of commissions claimed pursuant to a 
"finders agreement". This Court affirmed the trial court's 
summary judgment against the plaintiff based upon a violation of 
the statute in performing real estate broker's services without 
the required license. 
In a recent contractor's licensing action, Meridian Corporation 
vs. McGlynn/Garmaker Company, 567 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977), the 
plaintiff attempted to recover on a construction contract though 
he was unlicensed in Utah as a contractor. The Court cited 
Olsen vs. Reece, 144 Utah 411, 200 P.2d 733 (1948) finding the 
contractor in violation of a Utah regulatory statute, and 
therefore, barred from recovery. It reaffirmed the principle 
recognized in Olsen whereby licensing provisions are placed into 
two categories. First, for the purpose of regulation and 
protection of the public and second, for purpose of revenue. In 
the first situation, contracts made by unlicensed persons are 
void. In the second situation, contracts made by unlicensed 
persons are avoidable. The Court, in Meridian, held that the 
contract was void and stated that the statute had been passed for 
the public's protection. Real estate licensing statutes, too, are 
intended to protect the public from irresponsible realtors (See 
Andersen vs. Johnson, 160 P.2d 725 (Utah 1945). 
Plaintiffs, in violation of these "regulatory laws" are 
required to allege and prove their proper licensing in order to 
-8-
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state a cause of action. Smith vs. American Packing and 
Provisions Company, 102 Utah 351, 130 P.2d 951. The Smith court 
refused to overturn the Olsen decision and reaffirmed these 
"principles of law. to be the laws of this state." The same 
principles are cited in a well driller case, which turned upon the 
required license issue. Mosely vs. Johnson, 22 Utah 2d 348, 453 
P.2d 149 (1969). This Court held that the statute requiring 
drillers to secure a license was designed to protect the people of 
the state. Anyone drilling a well without this license could not 
recover for services, either on the contract or on a theory of 
quantum meruit. 
In 27 Am Jur 2d, Section 117, Equity, it states: 
"A court of equity has no more right than has a court of law 
to act on its own notion of what is right in a particular 
case; it must be guided by the established rules and 
precedents ••• it is its duty to follow these principles 
which have been established by precedent • • • a court of 
equity is never required or justified in rendering an equitable 
decision or decree or in aiding the accomplishment of that 
which is a violation of law or public policy ••• where 
rights are defined or established by existing legal 
principles, they may not be changed or unsettled in equity. 
A court of equity may not create rights not previously 
existing at law • • • " 
Defendants contend that the trial court in the present case 
committed error in allowing recovery on equitable principles and 
contrary to the precedent of the above referred to cases and the 
above referred to statutes. The Mosley rationale for denying 
equitable recovery was stated as: 
"that to allow one to evade the law and recover for work 
which he is forbidden to pursue flys in the face of the 
statutory intent." (453, P.2d 153) 
When an agreement is negotiated by one required by statute to 
maintain a license, the right to equitable recovery based on 
-9-
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performance depends upon the purpose of the licensing statute. 
If legislative intent is to protect the public from fraud, 
misrepresentation and dishonest and incompetent persons, all 
agreements made by such unlicensed parties are held illegal, void 
and unenforceable. The wrongdoer is denied any recovery for 
services rendered, either based on the contract or an equitable 
theory of quantum meruit. Conversely, when the legislature 
intended the statute for revenue purposes, then substantial 
performance could render the agreement enforceable through equity. 
However, under the present fact situation before the Court, the 
intent of the real estate statute as announced by this Court in 
Anderson, supra,, is that the law is enacted for the regulation 
and registration of those engaged in real estate broker 
transactions and it is not created to raise revenue. 
The trial court held that the defendants ratified an 
otherwise void agreement through their continual performance of 
agreement obligations. The Second Restatement of Contract Law, 
Section 13(a) declares that: 
"A void agreement or promise is no contract at law and it is 
void of legal effect. This is not to be confused with a 
voidable agreement which acknowledges the validity of the 
transaction but reserves to one or both parties the right to 
avoid the obligations of the agreement. Voidable agreements, 
unlike a void agreement, are subject to a ratification which 
terminate the parties rights of avoidance. A party to 
a voidable agreement, may by his words or acts, resurrect and 
bind himself to his obligations under the agreement." 
In 17 Am Jur 2d, Section 7, Contracts, it states: 
"A void contract is no contract at all; it binds no one and 
is a mere nullity ••• an action cannot be maintained for 
damages for its breach." 
-10-
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Defendants argue that the trial court erred in finding an 
acquiescence through past payments under the marketing agreement. 
It has been held that payment for services rendered under a void 
agreement is insufficient to ratify the contract. See Milford 
vs. Milford Water Company, 124 Pa 610, 17A, 185. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH WERE 
ESSENTIAL TO PLAINTIFFS' RECOVERY. 
The trial court failed to consider the unlawful actions of 
Global. It overlooked the legal principles which should have 
rendered plaintiffs unable to bring this action. Therefore, the 
court erred in giving judgment to the plaintiff on unspecified 
equitable grounds, without first resolving these facts as they 
ii 
11 relate to the law. A trial court's power to decide a case in law 
or in equity is not argued, but a court may not disregard clearly 
applicable legal precedents in deciding intuitively what is right 
in a particular action. The trial court said: 
"· •• the court ••• does not deem it necessary to decide 
the case upon legal principles of law but will do so on 
equitable principles." (See Memorandum Decision R. 90) 
A court may not waive its imaginative equitable wand and 
cause the disappearance of precedent and statutory regulations 
which both the Utah Legislature and the Utah Supreme Court have 
endeavored to preserve as a protection to the public. Questions 
are not to be decided on the basis of "raw equity" when such 
relief blatantly defies legal principles and precedents in 
conflict thereof. See Empire Engineering Corporation vs. Mack, 
217 NY 85, 11 NE 475. 
-11-
I 
I 
I 
l 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In its memorandum decision, the trial court acknowledged 
confusion as to the relationship of the parties. It was the 
court's responsibility to sort out the confusion and clarify the 
status of the parties as defined by law. This duty was not 
carried out. The existence of a legally recognized relationship 
is germaine to any decision based on the real estate licening 
statutes. The plaintiff's burden has been clearly defined as 
"alleging and proving it was duly licensed as a real estate broker 
at the time the cause of action arose." This issue has not yet 
been decided. Only a licensed broker is recognized by statute as 
having sufficient personal standing to bring such an action. 
Part of the dispute at the time of trial was whether the 
Wincor transaction had ever been completed and closed (See Exhibit 
2). Evidence was introduced to show that the obligation of the 
vendor in completing the improvements that were part of the 
transaction were never made. Wincor never possessed the property 
and received the return of all funds they had paid and the 
property continues to the present in the ownership of Cedar Hills. 
On the other hand, plaintiffs contend that the transaction was 
closed by reason of the fact that a uniform real estate contract 
was entered into and a partial commission paid on November 24, 
1976. In its memorandum decision, the court states that the 
plaintiffs are entitled to judgment in the amount of $6,780 "if in 
fact the sale upon which the commission is claimed is completed 
and the transaction closed." The court circumvented its respon-
sibility in making a finding of fact on this disputed matter. It 
remains to the present time, the contention of the defendants, 
that the transaction was never fully completed and therefore, 
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there would be no liability for the commission as ordered by the 
court. 
ARGUMENT III 
DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM FOR A SUM OF ONE TO THREE TIMES THE 
AMOUNT OF COMMISSION PAID AT THE TIME THE PLAINTIFFS WERE 
UNLICENSED SHOULD BE GRANTED. 
Utah Code Annotated, 61-2-17(b) reads: 
"In case any person ••• or corporation shall have received 
any sum of money ••• as commission ••• by or in consequence 
of his violation of any provision of this act, such person . 
• • or corporation shall also be liable to a penalty of not 
less than the amount of the sum of money so received and not 
more than three times the sum so received, as may be 
determined by the court, which penalty may be sued for and 
recovered by any person agrieved and for his use and benefit, 
in any court of competent jurisdiction." 
The sum of $33,945 was paid by the defendants to the 
plaintiffs at a time when there was no licensed broker associated 
with the plaintiffs (See defendants' exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10; 
also answers to defendants' interrogatories). To allow plaintiffs 
to avoid any such penalty would be circumventing the intent of the 
Legislature. 
SUMMARY 
Plaintiffs have, in numerous instances, violated Utah law 
regulating real estate licensing. The plaintiffs are not entitled 
to collect the commission on the Wincor transaction because of 
such violation and further because of the fact that the 
transaction was never closed. The sum of $101,835, three times 
$33,945, which was paid by the defendants during a time when the 
plaintiffs were not licensed, should be '/ffiposed in the form of a 
penalty against the plaintiffs. 
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DATED this 8th day of January, 1980. 
WILSON 
for Defendant/Appellants 
350 East Center 
Provo, Utah 84601 
375-9801 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
/£~/! 
I hereby certify that I ~ a copy of the foregoing to H. 
Grant Ivins, Attorney for Plaintiffs/Respondents, 75 North Center, 
American Fork, Utah, 84003, postage prepaid this _:;____ day of 
January, 1980. 
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